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Abstract
This paper constructs a model that describes inflation cycles and prolonged
depression as generated by the learning behavior of households who face a ran-
dom liquidity shock in which money is needed. Households update the subjec-
tive probability of the shock based on the observation and change their liquidity
preference accordingly. In this setting, we first derive a stationary cycles under
perfect price adjustment, which is characterized by periods of gradual inflation
and sudden sporadic falls of the price level. When the nominal stickiness is
introduced, the liquidity shock is followed by a period of depression in which
unemployment exists and deflation occurs gradually. Depression is deep and
prolonged when the economy has experienced a long period of boom before
encountering a liquidity shock.
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1 Introduction
This paper constructs a model that describes the cyclical movement of price level
inflation and the possibility of prolonged depression as generated by the learning
behavior of households. The representative household experiences a utility loss when
a liquidity shock occurs, and the loss is smaller if she has a larger amount of money.
The liquidity shock is randomly generated by a Poisson process, and the Poisson
parameter, or the probability of the shock, changes unobservably following a Markov
process (i.e., the shock occurs according to a certain Markov modulated Poisson
process). The household updates the subjective probability of the shock based on
the observation of the actual occurrences of the shock.1
In this setting, we first derive a stationary cycles under perfect price adjustment,
which is characterized by the periods of gradual inflation and sudden sporadic defla-
tions. The price level must jumps down when the liquidity shock occurs because the
information delivered by the news of the liquidity shock is large enough to change
the household’s belief discretely. Such downward jumps are, however, unlikely to
occur in the actual economies where various nominal frictions prevent the price level
and/or the nominal wage to fall too rapidly; e.g., labor unions, moral issues, etc.
Thus, we extend the benchmark model to incorporate the nominal stickiness that
1An example of such events is a bank run; even though people usually do business using checks,
once a bank run occurs their transactions cannot be settled without money. This example suggests
that the desire to hold money depends on the expectation about the possibility of such events in the
future. When people observe a bank run, they guess that the underlying circumstance for banks
is bad and therefore another bank may fail in near future. Thus, in this event they increase the
demand for money to cope with another similar event. Given that the supply of nominal money
cannot be changed instantly, the strong liquidity preference pushes up the value of money in terms
of goods and therefore deflation occurs. Conversely, if banks operates successfully for a long time,
people guess that the circumstance is stable and that it is unlikely for a bank run to occur in near
future. Then, the money demand decreases, causing inflation.
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puts an upper bound on the rate of deflation.
In the modified setting where price and thus the real money supply cannot jump,
the representative household cannot increase the real money holding instantly when
the subjective shock probability jumps up. The expected marginal utility of money
holding stays high and the household decrease the amount of consumption to equalize
the marginal rate of substitution between money and goods to the cost of holding
money. This means that the liquidity shock causes a depression rather than a discrete
fall in the price level. The drop in output is followed by a gradual recovery, in which
price falls gradually. Once the price level falls to a certain threshold, the equilibrium
in the goods and money markets is regained and then gradual inflation occurs.
The important finding is that the magnitude of depression is larger when the
economy experiences a long period without the liquidity shock before encountering
one because in that case price must fall significantly to regain the equilibrium in the
money market. On the other hand, a economy with recurrent shocks harms little
from an addition shock (e.g., a bank run) because the price level is already near
the lowest level. The inflation rate immediately before the crush is not necessarily
higher in the former case than the latter; specifically, the inflation rate converges to
the rate of money growth (which should be the long-run average) when the economy
luckily proceeds without a crush for a very long time. Thus, our result implies that
an economy performing well for a long time is vulnerable to get into the long period
of depression even when its contemporary inflation rate is low.
There exist a number of earlier studies that analyzed the macroeconomic behavior
when an underlying state is only partially observable and information are revealed
gradually (e.g., Andolfatto and Gomme 2003; Chalkley and Lee 1998; Horii and
Ono 2005; Potter 2000; Sill and Wrase 1999 ). Those studies typically construct
models in a way that the current belief regarding the underlying state determines
macroeconomic variables at each date. This is also the case in our model when
price adjustments are complete: i.e., the current belief on the risk of financial crises
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uniquely determines the current price level so that the demand and the supply of the
real money balance equalize.
However, when nominal stickiness is introduced, the price level cannot completely
follow the path that corresponds to the realized evolution of the belief. As a result,
the current price level is determined not only by the current belief on the underlying
state of the economy, but also by the history of beliefs that people held in the
past. Accordingly, whether an economy experiences inflation and full employment,
or deflation and unemployment, is not solely determined by how frequently financial
shocks have occurred recently, but also by how the economy (i.e., the price level) has
adapted to such occurrences.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the process of
the liquidity shock and the evolution of the belief that is updated based on Bayes’ law.
Section 3 presents a benchmark model in which the price level is perfectly adjusted
and shows the pattern of inflation cycles. The nominal stickiness is introduced in
Section 4 to investigate the pattern of the crush and recovery. Section 5 concludes
the paper. The proofs of all Lemmata are collated in Appendix.
2 Liquidity Shock and Bayesian Learning
We use a continuous-time model in which a representative household faces an ag-
gregate liquidity shock that follows an exogenous Poisson process. Liquidity holding
generates utility when the shock actually occurs, but does not while the shock does
not occur. Since when the shock occurs cannot exactly be anticipated, even during
the period without it the household holds liquidity so as to prepare for it.
There are two underlying states with different probabilities of the shock, called
states H and L. In state i ∈ {H,L} the shock occurs with probability θi per unit
time, where θH > θL > 0. The household cannot directly observe the current state
but knows that the state evolves according to a Markov process: state H changes to
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state L with Poisson probability pH per unit time whereas state L changes to state
H with probability pL.
By observing whether the shock occurs or not she continuously revises her subjec-
tive shock probability in a Bayesian manner. Let θt denote the true shock probability
at time t, which is unknown to her. Using information available up to time t, she
forms a belief that θt = θH with probability ft(θH) and θt = θL with probability
ft(θL). Obviously,
ft(θL) + ft(θH) = 1 for any t. (1)
In order to find how she updates ft(θi) from t to t+∆t,2 we first obtain the sub-
jective probability that the shock does not occur between t and t+∆t for given ft(θi).
It is denoted by Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ
¤
, where Ft[·] is a probability operator based on in-
formation available at t, S(a,b] is the set of dates on which the shock actually occurs
during (a, b], and φ the empty set. Since the underlying state is either H or L at time
t+∆t, this probability is divided into two components, Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θH
¤
and Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θL
¤
.
Each of the two components is further divided into two probabilities. The former
is the sum of the probability that ‘the state is H at time t and neither the state change
nor the shock occurs during the interval’ and the probability that ‘the present state
is L and the state changes to H during the interval.’ It is3
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θH
¤
=
¡
1− (θH + pH)∆t
¢
ft(θH) + pL∆tft(θL). (2)
Similarly, the latter is
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θL
¤
=
¡
1− (θL + pL)∆t
¢
ft(θL) + pH∆tft(θH). (3)
2Time interval ∆t is taken to be so short that the probability that the liquidity shock and a
state change coexist in the interval is negligible.
3Throughout the paper we ignore the second-order term of ∆t and higher because ∆t→ 0.
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Summing up (2) and (3) yields
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ
¤
= 1− θet∆t, (4)
where θet represents the expected (or subjective) probability of the shock per unit
time at time t:
θet ≡ θHft(θH) + θLft(θL). (5)
Let us consider how the representative household updates her belief if she eventu-
ally finds that the shock did not occur during (t, t+∆t]. In this case the information
that S(t,t+∆t] = φ is added to her knowledge. Thus, using Bayes’ law we find updated
subjective probability ft+∆t(θi) to be
ft+∆t(θi) ≡ Ft+∆t
£
θt+∆t = θi
¤
= Ft
£
θt+∆t = θi|S(t,t+∆t] = φ
¤
=
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ ∩ θt+∆t = θi
¤
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] = φ
¤ .
Since the numerator is given by (2) or (3) and the denominator by (4), ft+∆t(θH)
equals4
ft+∆t(θH) =
¡
1− (θH + pH)∆t
¢
ft(θH) + pL∆tft(θL)
1− θet∆t
.
From this equation we derive the time derivative of ft(θH):
dft(θH)
dt
= lim
∆t→0
ft+∆t(θH)− ft(θH)
∆t
= (θet − θH − pH)ft(θH) + pLft(θL).
(6)
We next consider the case where the shock occurs during (t, t+∆t]. Since
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] 6= φ ∩ θt+∆t = θi
¤
= θift(θi)∆t for i ∈ {L,H}, (7)
the probability that the shock occurs is
Ft
£
S(t,t+∆t] 6= φ
¤
=
¡
θHft(θH) + θLft(θL)
¢
∆t = θet∆t, (8)
4ft+∆t(θL) is analogously obtained. From (1) it equals 1− ft+∆t(θH).
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which is consistent with (4). From Bayes’ law dividing (7) by (8) gives the updated
subjective probability that θt+∆t = θi under the condition that the shock occurs
during (t, t+∆t]. It is
ft(θi) = lim
t0→t−0
θift0(θi)
θet0
≡ θ
ift−0(θi)
θet−0
, (9)
where subscript t− 0 represents the state just before t.
Finally, we obtain the dynamics of subjective probability θet . From (1) and (5),
ft(θH) =
θet − θL
θH − θL , ft(θ
L) =
θH − θet
θH − θL . (10)
Substituting (6) and (10) into the time derivative of (5) yields the time derivative of
θet in the case where the shock does not occur at time t:
θ˙et = (θet − θL − pL)(θet − θH − pH)− pLpH ≡ g(θet ) for t /∈ S(0,∞), (11)
which satisfies
g(θ) Q 0⇐⇒ θ R θ∗ for any θ ∈
£
θL, θH
¤
, where
θ∗ ≡ θ
L + θH + pL + pH −
p
(θH + pH − θL − pL)2 + 4pLpH
2
∈ (θL, θH). (12)
Similarly, by substituting (9) and (10) into (5) we obtain the value of θet as a function
of θet−0 in the case where the shock does occur at time t.
θet = θL + θH −
θLθH
θet−0
≡ h(θet−0) for t ∈ S(0,∞), (13)
which satisfies
h(θH) = θH , and θe < h(θe) < θH for all θe ∈ (θL, θH).
Equations (11) and (13) describe the dynamics of θet with and without the shock
respectively. It continuously declines as long as the shock does not occur, but dis-
cretely jumps upward when it occurs.5 Intuitively, in the absence of the shock people
5From (11) and (13), we find that θet is trapped within interval
¡
θ∗, θH
¤
in the long run. Since
we are interested in the long-term behavior of the economy, it is assumed throughout this paper
that θet is always within
¡
θ∗, θH
¤
. Under this assumption, θet always declines while the shock does
not occur.
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gradually become more and more optimistic and confident that the economy is in
state L. Thus, their subjective probability of the shock gradually declines and con-
verges to θ∗.6 Due to the U-shape of function g(θet ), the speed of adjusting their
belief is slower when θet is near either θ∗ or θH than when it is in the middle.
Conversely, when the shock is observed, people discretely change their expectation
about the present state. Since h(θe) > θe, the more often people observe the shock,
the more strongly people believe that they are in state H, and hence θet becomes
closer to θH . In this way θet fluctuates between θ∗ and θH .
3 Inflation Cycles under Perfect Price Adjustment
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived homogeneous households
with measure one. Each household is endowed a unit labor at each point time and
supplies labor inelastically to the labor market. A representative firm produces goods
from labor. The output is y`t, where y > 0 is a constant and `t is labor input. Since
total labor supply is one, the aggregate output would be y each time as long as full
employment obtains. The monetary authority issues a constant amount of nominal
money stock, the size of which is normalized to one.7 Goods are perishable and thus
cannot be stored. The households will not borrow or lend among themselves because
the are identical. The firm has no value because of its linear production technology
and perfect competition. Therefore, money is the only asset in this economy.
At each date, the representative household gains utility u(ct) from consumption,
6θet never becomes lower than θ∗(> θL) since people take into account the possibility that state
L might have changed to state H even though the shock does not occur.
7This assumption is made only for the simplicity of the description of the model and notations.
The results to follow are essentially the same even when the nominal money growth rate is positive
and constant. In that case the price level would not be stationary, and therefore we need to
normalize the price level by by dividing by the nominal money supply.
8
where instantaneous felicity function u(·) is twice differentiable, u0(·) > 0, and satis-
fies the Inada conditions. In addition, she experiences utility loss v(mt) < 0 according
to her real money holding mt at the dates at which the liquidity shock occurs. We
assume v0(m) > 0, which means that the size of utility loss is small when her real
money holding is large. Function v(·) also satisfies v00(m) < 0, limm→0mv0(m) > 0,
and limm→∞ v
0(m) = 0. Her expected utility EUt is therefore given by
EUt = Et


Z ∞
t
u(cτ )e
−ρ(τ−t)dτ +
X
τ∈S(t,∞)
v(mτ )e
−ρ(τ−t)

 , (14)
where ρ is her subjective discount rate and S(t,∞) is the set of future dates at which
the shock occurs.
Let pt denote the price of consumption good, and Wt the nominal wage at t. The
household maximize (14) under the budget constraint
M˙t = Wt − ptct. (15)
Since there is no friction in the market, full employment always obtains and thus
Wt = pty for all t. Thus, in the real terms, (15) becomes
m˙t = y − πtmt − ct when pt changes continuously, (16)
mt = mt−0/Πt when pt jumps, (17)
where πt ≡ p˙t/pt and Πt ≡ pt/pt−0.
There is no steady state in equilibrium at which the price level stays constant
for all t because the expectation about the probability of the liquidity shock changes
forever according to (11) and (13) and the decisions of household depend on θet . We
instead search for a stationary equilibrium dynamics in which pt evolves as a function
of θet . Specifically, we search for a function p(·) that satisfies8
pt = p(θet ) for all t. (18)
8This approach is similar to Lucas (1978).
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Then, the inflation rate can also be written as a function of θet ,
πt =
p0(θet )
p(θet )
g(θet ) ≡ π(θet ), Πt =
p(h(θet ))
p(θet )
≡ Π(θet ). (19)
We are interested in a monetary equilibrium path in which money has a positive
value. Suppose that pt0 = ∞ for some date t0, which means that money has no
value at t0. Then, it follows that pt = ∞ for all t ≥ t0 since otherwise an arbitrage
opportunity arises: consumers can obtain an arbitrary amount of money at date
t0 at no cost and then sell money (i.e., purchase goods) at a date in which pt is
finite to increase their expected utility. Since θet evolves within (θ∗, θH) recurrently,
(18) implies that if p(θ∞) = ∞ for some θ∞ ∈ (θ∗, θH) then p(θe) = ∞ for all
θe ∈ (θ∗, θH). That is, if there is such θ∞, then pt =∞ for all t and therefore money
is never demanded. Since the nonmonetary equilibrium dynamics is obvious and is
of no interest here, we assume that9
Assumption 1 p(θe) ∈ (0,∞) for all θe ∈ (θ∗, θH).
Let U(θe, m) denote the value function of a household with belief θe and real
money holding m. Then, the bellman equation for the problem of (11), (13), (14),
(16) and (17), combined with (18) and (19), is
U(θe, m) = max
c
h
u(c)∆t+ (θe∆t)v(m00)
+
1
1 + ρ∆t
©
(1− θe∆t)U(θe0,m0) + (θe∆t)U(h(θ),m00)
ªi
,
(20)
where θe0 = θe+ g(θe)∆t, m0 = m+(y−π(θe)m− c)∆t, and m00 = m/Π(θe). Taking
the limit ∆t→ 0 in (20) yields the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
problem:
ρU(θe,m) = max
c
h
u(c) + θe
¡
v(m/Π(θe)) + U(h(θe),m/Π(θe))− U(θe, m)
¢
+ g(θe)Uθ(θe, m) +
¡
y − π(θe)m− c
¢
Um(θe,m)
i
.
(21)
9We also rule out the possibility that p(θe) = 0 for some θe ∈ (θ∗, θH) because the value of
consumption good never becomes zero from u0(·) > 0.
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Differentiating the right hand side of (21) with respect to c gives the first order
condition
u0(ec) = Um(θe, m), (22)
where ec denotes the optimal amount of consumption. Since θet and mt evolves ac-
cording to (11) and (16), equation (22) shows that the movement of consumption is
characterized by
d
dt
u0(ect) = g(θet )Umθ + ¡y − π(θe)m− ec¢Umm for t /∈ S(0,∞), (23)
abbreviating the arguments for U(·, ·) functions when they are (θe,m). From the
envelope theorem, (21) can be differentiated with respect to m at c = ec to give
(ρ+ π(θe) + θe)Um =g(θe)Uθm +
¡
y − π(θe)m− ec¢Umm
+ θeΠ(θe)−1
¡
v0(m/Π(θe) + Um(h(θe),m/Π(θe))
¢
.
(24)
By substituting (22) and (23) for (24), we can eliminate the value function from it
to obtain the Euler equation,
d
dt
u0(ect) = (ρ+ π(θe) + θe)u0(ect)− θe v0(mt/Π(θe)) + u0(ec00t )Π(θe) for t /∈ S(0,∞), (25)
where ec00t represents the optimal amount of consumption when the state changes to
(h(θet ),m/Π(θet )).
Since all households are symmetric, the goods and money markets clear when
ect = y, mt = p(θet )−1 for all t. (26)
Function p(·) is determined so that the household’s demand for goods and money
satisfies (26) given the path of price, (18). Substituting (26) into (25) yields a
condition that must be satisfied for all possible values of θe,
ρ+ π(θe) = θeΠ(θe)−1v0(p(h(θe))−1) + θe
¡
Π(θe)−1 − 1
¢
. (27)
The left hand side represents the cost of holding money: the utility loss from post-
poning consumption plus the capital loss caused by inflation. In the other side are
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the expected benefits of holding money: the first term is the expected utility from
holding money, whereas the second term represents the expected capital gain by the
downward jump in the price level (the upward jump in the value of money) when
the liquidity shock occurs. Thus, (27) shows that function p(·) is determined so that
the cost and the benefit of holding money are equalized with each other.
From (19) and (27), we obtain a (delay) differential equation for p(·).
p0(θe) = p(θ
e)
g(θe)γp(θ
e), where
γp(θe) ≡ −(ρ+ θe) + θe
p(θe)
p(h(θe))
v0(p(h(θe))−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
.
(28)
Note that γp(θe) gives the growth rate of pt (i.e., the inflation rate) that must hold
in absence of the liquidity shock as a function of θet . Since functions u, v, g, h are
already known, (28) is an autonomous differential equation with respect to function
p(·). The following lemma gives a boundary condition with which function p(·) is
pinned down.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1 and transversality condition10
lim
T→∞
Ete
−ρ(T−t)u0(cT )mT = 0 for all t, (29)
function γp(·) must satisfy limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) = 0.
proof: in appendix
Note that pt converges to zero as θet → θ∗ if γp(θe) is negative at the limit. Then
the real money holding of a household, mt = p
−1
t , increases unboundedly in a way
that the transversality condition is violated. Conversely, the positive limiting value
of γp(θe) means that pt becomes arbitrarily large. In this case, the value of money
vanishes in a finite time period, which violates the assumption of the monetary
equilibrium.
10Operator Et represents the expectation based on the information available to agents at date t.
12
(a) The shape of function P (θe)
(b) Evolution of inflation rate
Figure 1: Inflation cycles without nominal frictions
The stationary dynamics of a monetary equilibrium can be calculated from (28)
and the boundary condition given by Lemma 1. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the
representative shape of function p(·) against θe, which is downward sloping.11 A
large value of θet means that people anticipates that the liquidity shock occurs with a
high probability. In that situation, their liquidity preference is high. Thus, to clear
the market for money, the value of money must be sufficiently high in relative to the
value of good, which means a low price level.
During the period without the liquidity shock, θet gradually declines and pt in-
creases. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the evolution of inflation rate against time
as θet moves from θH to θ∗. Inflation accelerates temporarily when the households
adjusts their belief responding to observing no shock for a certain time length, but
it gradually falls to the rate of nominal money growth, which is zero in this case,
as the economy converges to the most optimistic state. When the liquidity shock
occurs, θet jumps up. Then pt jumps down so that the (θet , pt) pair is always on the
curve depicted in panel (a). Thus, the dynamics of the economy is characterized by
11In all examples presented in this paper, we specify u(c) = ln c, v(m) = −m−1, y = 1, ρ = .05,
θH = .5, θL = .05, pH = .025 and pL = .0025. We have confirmed that our results are robust to
changes in parameter values.
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gradual inflation with sporadic and discrete falls in the price level.
At each event of the liquidity shock, price level must jump down in order to clear
the increased liquidity demand induced by the change in people’s belief. However,
we rarely observe such a discrete fall in the price level in the aggregate economy;
although we do sometimes observe a discrete fall in the prices of certain goods, the
aggregated general price level tends to fall only slowly. One explanation for this is
the existence of a (downward) nominal stickiness in the price level caused by labor
unions, menu costs, moral issues, and the all other factors discussed in the literature.
If the price cannot jump downward, our model predicts that the demand for money
exceeds for the supply, and, by Warlas’ law, a demand shortage occurs in the goods
and labor market. The next section investigates this possibility.
4 Depressions with Nominal Stickiness
Consider an economy similar to the one introduced in the previous section, with a
only difference in that the price level cannot fall faster than a certain rate,12
p˙t/pt ≥ −δ, δ ∈ (0,∞). (30)
The discrete fall in the price level derived in the previous section implies that the
instantaneous rate of inflation is minus infinity. Condition (30) rules out this possi-
bility by assuming that δ is finite. The immediate consequence of this restriction is as
follows. Even when the liquidity preference jumps up following the liquidity shock,
the real money supply p−1t cannot increase instantly. The representative household
then feels that money at their hands is more valuable than before, and consequently
reduces the demand for goods. It creates a shortage in the goods market, which
12Condition (30) is equivalent to assuming that W˙t/Wt ≥ −δ because the competition of firms
ensures pt = yWt for all t. We could also assume a symmetric restriction such as p˙t/pt ∈ [−δ, δ].
This would make the analysis a little complicated without changing the final results.
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cannot be cleared instantly because of the nominal stickiness in pt.
This consideration implies that there are several differences in the pattern of
economic dynamics from the case analyzed in the previous section. Now there is
no one-for-one relationship between the price level and the belief because pt cannot
jump when θet changes discretely. Thus, the state of the economy is described not
only by θet but by the pair of (θet , pt). Consumption does not necessarily coincide
with the full employment output y. We can imagine two possibilities at each point
in time. First, constraint (30) is not binding and full employment obtains (wt = y).
The second possibility is that (30) is binding, i.e., p˙t/pt = −δ, and unemployment
exists (wt < y).
Which one of these possibilities occurs depends on the state of the economy,
summarized by (θet , pt). It is natural to guess that, for a given level of θet , there is
a level of pt at which the money market clears and full employment obtains. Let
us denote this critical level by p(θet ). Price level pt cannot be below the threshold
p(θe) since there is no upward stickiness in the price level and thus can be adjusted
instantly if pt < p(θe). Similarly to the previous section, if there is some θ∞ ∈ (θ∗, θH)
such that p(θ∞) =∞ then pt =∞ for all t. We rule out this trivial path by assuming
that
Assumption 2 p(θe) ∈ (0,∞) for all θe ∈ (θ∗, θH).
Unemployment occurs when constraint (30) is binding, i.e., when p > p(θe). In
this case, the economy experience deflation at the rate of δ. If (30) is not binding,
full employment obtains and the price level evolves so that equilibrium condition
p = p(θe) is maintained. Let us denote by C(θe, p) aggregate demand for goods at
state (θe, p). Then,
C(θe, p)



= y if p = p(θe),
< y if p > p(θe).
(31)
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The inflation rate for a given state can be summarized as
π(θe, p) =



p0(θe)
p(θe)
g(θe) if p = p(θe),
− δ if p > p(θe).
(32)
The representative household maximize (14) under budget constraint (15). Since
the final good production is competitive and it uses only labor as input, the nominal
income of the representative household coincides with the nominal aggregate demand
for goods, Wt = ptC(θet , pt) for all t. The budget constraint can thus be written as
m˙t = C(θet , pt)− π(θet , pt)mt + ct (33)
as long as pt evolves continuously, and (17) if pt jumps. From (30), price level pt
never jumps down, and it jumps up only when θet jumps up to h(θet ) and pt is smaller
than the new market clearing price level, p(h(θet )). Let us denote the value function
of the household by U(θe, p,m), which now depends on the current value of p because
it affects the aggregate demand and thus her income. The Bellman equation for this
problem is
U(θe, p,m) = max
c
h
u(c)∆t+ (θe∆t)v(m00)
+
1
1 + ρ∆t
©
(1− θe∆t)U(θe0, p0,m0) + (θe∆t)U(h(θe), p00,m00)
ªi
,
(34)
where θe0 = θe+g(θe)∆t, p0 = p+π(θe, p)p∆t, m0 = m+(C(θe, p)−π(θe, p)m+c)∆t,
p00 = max{p(h(θ)), p}, and m00 = (p/p00)m. Taking the limit of ∆t→ 0 in (34) yields
the HJB equation,
ρU =max
c
h
u(c) + θe
¡
v(m00) + U(h(θe), p00,m00)− U
¢
+ g(θe)Uθ
+ π(θe, p)pUp +
¡
C(θe, p)− π(θe, p)m− c
¢
Um
i
,
(35)
where the arguments of function U(·, ·, ·) and its partial derivatives are abbreviated
when they are (θe, p,m). The first order condition for (35) is u0(ec) = Um(θe, p,m),
where ec is the optimal amount of consumption. Then, the envelope condition is
(ρ+ π(θe, p) + θe)Um =θe(p/p00)
¡
v0(m00) + Um(h(θe), p00,m00)
¢
+ g(θe)Uθm
+ π(θe, p)pUpm +
¡
C(θ, p)− π(θe, p)m− ec¢Umm. (36)
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Note that the RHS of (36) depends on whether p jumps in the event of the liquidity
shock. As long as function p(·) is weakly downward sloping, p ≥ p(θe) ≥ p(h(θe))
and therefore p00 = p and m00 = m. The following analysis focuses on this case and
we leave for Appendix the analysis of the case of p < p(h(θe)).
Substituting the first order condition, its time derivative, and the conditions for
the representative household, ec = C(θe, p) and m = p−1, into (36) yields the Euler
equation,Ã
ρ−
d
dt
u0(C(θe, p))
u0(C(θe, p))
!
+ π(θe, p) = θe v
0(p−1)
u0(C(θe, p))
+ θe
µ
u0(C(h(θe), p))
u0(C(θe, p))
− 1
¶
(37)
for all t /∈ S(0,∞). Equation (37) has an interpretation similar to (27). The cost of
holding money, given by the LHS, is the sum of time preference and inflation. The
benefit is the sum of the direct utility gain and the expected capital gain measured
in terms of utility when a shock occurs and consumption jumps down.
Functions p(·) and C(·, ·) are determined so that equation (37) holds for all possi-
ble pairs of (θe, p). Let us first consider the case of full employment, where p = p(θe),
C(θe, p) = y and π(θe, p) = p0(θe)g(θe)/p(θe) from (31) and (32). Substituting these
for (37) gives a differential equation that determines the form of function p(·):
p0(θe) = p(θ
e)
g(θ)
γp(θe), where
γp(θe) = −(ρ+ θe) + θe
v0 (p(θe)−1) + u0(C(h(θe), p(θe)))
u0(y)
.
(38)
Function γp(θe) in (38) represents the growth rate of pt ≡ p(θet ) as a function of
θet assuming that p ≥ p(θe). The correct expression for γp(θe) when p < p(θe) is
given by (43) in Appendix A. The difference between (28) and (38) lies in the fact
that consumption is adjusted in the occurrence of the liquidity shock when nominal
stickiness exists, while adjustment is done fully by the price level when price is
completely flexible. A boundary condition for function p(·) is given by the following
lemma.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2 and transversality condition (29), function γp(·)
must satisfy limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) = 0
proof: in appendix
Suppose that limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0, which implies that p(θe) approaches 0 as θe con-
verges to θ∗. This means that the level of p must also converges to 0 since it evolves
according either to p˙/p = p(θe) < 0 or to p˙/p = −δ < 0 as θe → 0. Lemma 1 shows
that the transversality condition is violated in this case. In addition, the limiting
value of γp(θe) as θe → θ∗ should not be positive since otherwise Assumption 2 is
violated. Thus, function p(·) must satisfy differential equation (38) and boundary
condition limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) = 0.
Next, consider the case of unemployment, where π(θe, p) = −δ. Substituting this
for (37) gives a partial differential equation of function C(·, ·),
g(θe)Cθ(θe, p)− pδCp(θe, p) =
u0(C(θe, p))
u00(C(θe, p))γu
0(θe, p), where
γu0(θe, p) = ρ− δ + θe − θe
v0 (p−1) + u0(C(h(θe), p))
u0(C(θe, p))
.
(39)
In (39), γu0(θe, p) is the rate of change in marginal utility. Combined with the bound-
ary condition C(θe, p(θe)) = y for all θe, this partial differential equation determines
the shape of function C(·, ·) for all (θe, p) ∈ {(θe, p)|p > p(θe))}.
Since p(·) and C(·, ·) are interrelated as described above, they are determined
simultaneously so that they satisfy the system of partial differential equations, (38)
and (39), along with two boundary conditions specified above. Figure 2 shows a
representative shape of function C(·, ·) in (θe, p) space, where the solid curve on the
edge represents function p(·). Observe that function p(·) is downward sloping in
θe. The reason behind it is the same as the reason for the property of p(·) in the
previous section: when θe is large, people’s liquidity preference is high and thus a
low price level (a high relative price of money to goods) is required to equalize the
money demand to the money supply. The height of curved surface indicates the
value of function C(θe, p) at each state in region p > p(θe). C(θe, p) is equal to y
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Figure 2: Representative shapes of function C(θe, p) and function p(θe)
on the curve of p = p(θe) and gets smaller as the pair (θe, p) moves to the direction
of north-east. That is, a pair of high θet and high pt implies a combination of high
liquidity preference, a low relative price of money to goods, and a small supply of
real money stock. In that case, the excess demand for money is huge and therefore
the aggregate demand for goods (and thus employment) is small.
The pattern of the dynamics of the economy is described as follows. If the current
price level pt is higher than the market clearing price level p(θet ), then price gradually
falls and consumption grows according to
p˙t
pt
= −δ, c˙t =
u0(ct)
u00(ct)
"
ρ− δ + θe − θet
v0
¡
p−1t
¢
+ u0(c00t )
u0(ct)
#
, (40)
where c00t ≡ C(h(θe), pt). As long as no shock occurs, the pair (θe, pt) follows (40)
until it reaches the market clearing line pt = p(θet ) in a finite time. From that time
on, consumption stays constant and the price level rises so that the pair traces the
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(a) phase diagram in (θe, p) space (b) phase diagram in (c, p) space
Figure 3: Inflation cycles with nominal stickiness
market clearing line,
p˙t
pt
= −(ρ+ θet ) + θet
v0(p−1t ) + u
0(c00t )
u0(y)
, ct = y. (41)
As θe approaches θ∗, the price level converges to p∗ ≡ p(θ∗), and inflation rate
converges to zero.
Figure 3 shows the pattern of movement of (θe, p) pair. Once a liquidity shock
occurs, the pair (θe, pt) jumps toward east. Since pt cannot jump immediately, the
economy follows (40) until it reaches the market clearing line and then again follows
(41). The liquidity shock may occur even before the economy goes back to the full
employment phase. If the shock occurs many times in a short while, θet changes
considerably while giving little time for the price level to adjust through deflation.
Then, consumption must decrease by large and, moreover, it takes long time for the
economy to regain full employment.
This problem becomes more serious if there had long been no shocks observed: in
that case, the price level have gone up to near the highest level p∗ ≡ p(θ∗) before the
shock occurs and thus the process of adjustment becomes a long way. Conversely,
when an economy is experiencing the liquidity shock regularly, then pt should always
be near the lowest level pH ≡ p(θH) and thus it will take a short time for the price
to adjust even after an avalanche of shocks. This mechanism explains why once a
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(a) actual price level (pt) and market clearing price (pt)
(b) consumption
Figure 4: Simulated time paths of pt, pt ≡ p(θet ), and ct
long-time booming economy experiences large negative shocks it has to go through
a long and deflationary period of depression, while recovery seems not so difficult
when the boom period preceding that was a short one.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of inflation cycles and prolonged depression based on
households’ learning behavior. The model is constructed in a number of steps. First,
we analyzed the process of Bayesian learning in continuous time by the representative
household who observes a shock that follows a certain Markov modulated Poisson
process. Second, using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, we investigated the evo-
lutions of consumption and money holding of the household who behaves rationally
based on his belief about the state of the economy. Third, we derived a stationary
cycle under perfect price adjustments in terms of a delay differential equation (or,
21
sometimes called a difference-differential equation), and demonstrated that the price
level would experience sporadic downward jumps in such a setting. Forth, we ex-
tended the model to incorporate nominal stickiness and derived stationary dynamics.
In this case, since the belief and the slow-moving real variables cannot correspond
one-to-one, we obtained a system of partial delay differential equations, by which
we have shown that the economy experience a prolonged depression if and only if it
have enjoyed a long tranquil periods before it experiences successive occurrence of
shocks.
Appendix
A Analysis of the case of p < p(h(θe))
If pt < p(h(θet )), p00 = p(h(θeT )) and m00 = mp/p(h(θet )) in (34), (35) and (36). Substi-
tuting the first order condition, its time derivative, and the equilibrium conditions,
ec = C(θe, p) and m = p−1, into (36) yields the Euler equation,Ã
ρ−
d
dt
u0(C(θe, p))
u0(C(θe, p))
!
+ π(θe, p)
= θe p
p(h(θe))
v0(p(h(θe))−1)
u0(C(θe, p))
+ θe
µ
p
p(h(θe))
u0(y)
u0(C(θe, p))
− 1
¶ (42)
for all t /∈ S(0,∞). Substituting p = p(θe), C(θe, p) = y and π(θe, p) = p0(θe)g(θe)/p(θe),
from (31) and (32), for (42) gives the growth rate of pt during the period of full em-
ployment:
γp(θe) = −(ρ+ θe) + θe
p(θe)
p(h(θe))
v0 (p(h(θe))−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
. (43)
When unemployment exists (i.e., p ≥ p(θe)), the rate of change in marginal utility is
obtained by substituting π(θe, p) = −δ for (42),
γu0(θe, p) = ρ− δ + θe + θe
p
p(h(θe))
v0 (p−1) + u0(y)
u0(C(θe, p))
. (44)
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B Proof of Lemmata
Let θnst,T , cnst,T , pnst,T and mnst,T denote respectively the values of θT , cT , pT and mT
conditional on that no shock occurs between t and T . Then, the probability that no
shock occurs between t and T is given by exp
³
−
R T
t
θnst dτ
´
.
The transversality condition (TVC) can be written as limT→∞EtVt,T = 0, where
Vt,T ≡ e−ρ(T−t)u0(cT )mT and Et denotes the expectation taken upon the information
available at t. Since u0(cT )mT ≥ 0 for all T ,
EtVt,T ≥ exp
µ
−
Z T
t
θnst dτ
¶
e−ρ(T−t)u0(cnst,T )mt,T ≡ V nst,T . (45)
Note that while Vt,T is a random variable, V
ns
t,T is a deterministic variable given the
information available at t. From (45), a necessary condition for the TVC is
lim
T→∞
V nst,T ≤ 0. (46)
Differentiating (45) with respect to T and using equilibrium condition mnst,T = 1/p
ns
t,T
yield
dV nst,T /dT
V nst,T
= −θnst,T − ρ+
du0(cnst,T )/dT
u0(cnst,T )
−
dpnst,T/dT
pnst,T
. (47)
Lemma 1
Without nominal stickiness, cnst,T = y for all T and thus du
0(cnst,T )/dT = 0. From (28),
(dpnst,T/dT )/p
ns
t,T = γp(θnsT ). Substituting these into (47) yields
dV nst,T
dT
= −θnst,T
p(θnst,T )
p(h(θnst,T ))
v0(p(h(θnst,T ))−1) + u0(y)
u0(y)
V nst,T . (48)
Using p(θnst,T ) = pnst,T = 1/mnst,T and the definition of V nst,T in (45), equation (48) reduces
to dV nst,T /dT = − exp(−
R T
t
ρ+θnst,v dv)θnst,TZ(h(θnst,T )), where Z(θ) ≡ (v0(p(θ)−1) + u0(y)) /p(θ).
Integrating this differential equation with respect to T from t to ∞ and using the
fact that V nst,t = u
0(y)mt give
lim
T→∞
V nst,T = u
0(y)mt −
Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z T
t
ρ+ θnst,v dv
¶
θnst,TZ(h(θnst,T )) dT. (49)
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Fix a small constant a > 0 and define a closed interval A ≡ [h(θ∗), h(θ∗ + a)] ∈
(θ∗, θH). Note that Assumption 1 implies that Z(θ) ∈ (0,∞) for all θ ∈ (θ∗, θH).
In addition, it is continuous in this interval because (28) implies that p(·) is dif-
ferentiable. Thus, there exist finite constants Zmin ≡ minθ∈A Z(θ) ∈ (0, 1) and
Zmax ≡ maxθ∈A Z(θ) ∈ (0, 1). Whenever θet ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a), θnst,T ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a) for all
T ≥ t. and therefore there is upper and lower bounds for the second term in the
RHS of (49), given byµ
θ∗Zmin
ρ+ θ∗ + a
,
(θ∗ + a)Zmax
ρ+ θ∗
¶
≡ (Imin, Imax) ⊂ (0,∞). (50)
Now suppose that limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0. Then as θet converges to θ∗, pt → 0 and
therefore mt → ∞. However, this violates the TVC since conditions (46), (49) and
(50) imply that the TVC requires mt ≤ Imax/u0(y) whenever θet ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a).
Suppose conversely that limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0. Then as θet converges to θ∗, pt →∞
and thereforemt → 0. For sufficiently smallmt, (49) and (50) imply limT→∞ V nst,T < 0.
Since V nst,t = u
0(ct)mt > 0 and V nst,T is continuous in T , there should be a value of T ≥ t
such that V nst,T = 0. From the definition of V
ns
t,T in (45) this implies that m
ns
t,T = 0 and
therefore p(θnst,T ) = pnst,T =∞, violating Assumption 1.
Lemma 2
We first derive a contradiction under assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0. Fix a > 0 and
define A = [h(θ∗), h(θ∗ + a)]. Then, from p(θ) ∈ (0,∞) and its continuity, there
exists pmin ≡ minθ∈A p(θ) ∈ (0,∞). The assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0 implies that
p(θ) → 0 as θ → θ∗. Recall, in addition, that pt falls at the rate of δ whenever
pt > p(θ∗). Thus, there is a positive probability that (θet , pt) pair satisfies θet < θ∗+a
and pt ≤ pmin when the liquidity shock does not occur for a sufficiently long while.
Suppose that the current (θet , pt) pair satisfies the above inequalities. Then
pnst,T < p(h(θnst,T )) for all T ≥ t, which means that the analysis in Appendix A applies.
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Substituting the results obtained in Appendix A into (47) yields
dV nst,T /dT
V nst,T
=



− θnst,T − ρ+ γu0(θnst,T ) + δ if pnst,T > p(θnst,T ),
− θnst,T − ρ− γp(θnst,T ) if pnst,T = p(θnst,T ).
(51)
Substituting (43) and (44) into (51) and using pnst,T = 1/m
ns
t,T and the definition of
V nst,T in it, equation (51) reduces to dV
ns
t,T /dT = − exp(−
R T
t
ρ + θnst,v dv)θnst,TZ(h(θnst,T )),
where Z(θ) ≡ (v0(p(θ)−1) + u0(y)) /p(θ). Integrating this differential equation with
respect to T from t to ∞ and using the fact that V nst,t = u0(cnst,T )mt give
lim
T→∞
V nst,T = u
0(cnst,T )mt −
Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z T
t
ρ+ θnst,v dv
¶
θnst,TZ(h(θnst,T )) dT. (52)
Note that h(θnst,T ) ∈ A for all T ≥ t and that there exists a finite constant
Zmax ≡ maxθ∈A Z(θ). From cnst,T ≤ y, u0(cnst,T ) ≥ u0(y) for all T . Thus (46) and (52)
jointly imply that
mt ≤
(θ∗ + a)Zmax
(ρ+ θ∗)u0(y)
. (53)
While assumption limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) < 0 implies that an arbitrarily large mt = 1/pt
realizes with a positive probability, the RHS of (53) is constant. Thus (53) and
hence the TVC will be violated with a positive probability.
Next, assume conversely that limθe→θ∗ γp(θe) > 0, which means that p(θe) become
arbitrarily large as θe → θ∗. Then, θnst,T ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + a) and pnst,T = p(θnst,T ) > pmax ≡
maxθ∈A p(θ) for sufficiently large T . In this case, Analysis in Section 4 applies and
full employment obtains. From mnst,T = 1/p
ns
t,T and (38),
dmnst,T
dT
= (ρ+ θnst,T )mnst,T − θnst,T
v0(mnst,T )m
ns
t,T + u
0(C(h(θnst,T ), 1/mnst,T ))mnst,T
u0(y)
(54)
for sufficiently large T . As T → ∞, p(θnst,T ) → ∞ and therefore mnst,T → 0. In
this case, (54) implies limT→∞ dm
ns
t,T/dT < θnsT u0(y)−1 limm→0 v0(m)m < 0, where the
latter inequality follows from the definition of v(·). These properties jointly imply
that there is a finite T such that mnst,T = 0 and therefore p(θnst,T ) = pnst,T =∞, violating
Assumption 2.
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